There has been a lot of talk about the capabilities of the NSA and the technical expertise they have. Don’t get me wrong, they certainly know what they’re doing and carry out highly sophisticated, complex attacks. Their tools, methods, exploits, and execution are top notch. People everywhere seem to be generalising this and are saying things like “security is dead” or “NSA cracks SSL everywhere” which just isn’t true. I’m sure that there are many cases where they’re able to break SSL in certain scenarios but to say that SSL is dead or that they had the ability to finally break the protocol and any ciphers it can use underneath is just wrong. For the remainder of this article I’m going to change my terminology a bit so that when I say SSL I mean SSL literally and not TLS. When I say TLS I mean TLS literally and not SSL. SSL is old by today’s standards and TLS is its successor.
It is generally safe to now say that SSL is insecure (remember, this is not TLS!) Unless you need to support really old clients/devices or have a very strange/unique situation you should not use SSL anymore. In fact, if you are using SSL 3.0 you are no longer PCI compliant! This shouldn’t really be surprising because SSL was superseded by TLS in 1999. So if you want to say that the NSA is able to break SSL 3.0 connections then you’re probably right in most cases since there is a much larger attack surface. If the server in question is poorly configured, misconfigured, or if it’s using SSL 2.0 you shouldn’t expect any security from it. SSL suffers from a bunch of known attacks, POODLE being one of the more well-known ones.
Now that we have SSL out of the way let’s talk about TLS and how the NSA is able to either get around or crack the encryption itself. As I mentioned earlier, TLS is the successor to SSL and should be the only protocol used going forward. TLS is widely supported, though the question of which version is most widely deployed is a bit trickier to answer. If you said that the NSA can break any and all TLS connections then I’d say that it depends and that most successful attacks on TLS are not directed at the encryption/protocol specifically.
For example, let’s say that the NSA (or any other agency/group) installed malware on your machine. In this case then yes, you might as well consider your traffic and/or anything else you do compromised. Now let’s say that the same malware was instead installed on a server that you’re connecting to via TLS (or SSL). Any connection coming in to that server should be considered insecure unless that server is configured specially (more on this later). Even with special configuration, if the malware is designed to handle those cases then you’re pretty much out of luck.
Man-in-the-middle attacks are also a possibility and if you’ve got an agency as large, skilled, powerful, and well-funded as the NSA then you can guarantee that they are intercepting traffic directly on the backbone of networks. Additionally, it may be safe to assume that legitimate certificates either “come easily” to agencies such as this or can be “acquired” in other ways. If you have a man-in-the-middle attack happening on the backbone with legitimate certificates being used you can be sure that your “secure” connection is really not so secure. Any and all of your data that’s being encrypted over a TLS connection that is being attacked in this way is completely decryptable by the party performing the attack. This is because the key that is being used in the encryption/decryption process is theirs! Of course they’ll be able to decrypt it.
Another method of sidestepping TLS (or SSL) is to acquire the key on the server that’s used to encrypt/decrypt the traffic. How would you acquire this key, you ask? Easy! If you have physical access to the server then just access it directly. Considering the NSA has many advanced exploits that are able to target a wide variety of platforms this becomes concerning. There is a way to mitigate this situation so that you don’t have a single key to be stolen by using something called forward secrecy. Forward secrecy (sometimes called perfect forward secrecy) ensures that a unique key is used for encrypting/decrypting data for a single session. This means that if the session key is compromised then it can only be used to decrypt data for the session in which it encrypted data for.
Pretty good, right?
Here’s the catch: the server in question usually needs to be configured for forward secrecy so you’re relying on the system administrators to properly setup the server for optimal security. This applies to other cases that we’ll talk about so you’ll see that a lot of factors end up falling on the system administrator to make sure that you’re not connecting to a poorly or misconfigured server which makes all the difference in the world.
There are of course more ways to indirectly attack TLS and SSL connections. Side-channel attacks are one example of a more sophisticated attack that usually (not always) requires physical proximity to the machine. Preying on weak random number generators that are used in the encryption process is another major attack vector. If you’ve got a weak random number generator used on the client or server side and a third party is able to predict a pattern from it then you should consider everything about the connection compromised.
So far we’ve talked about scenarios that give the NSA (or anyone really) the ability to intercept and decrypt your traffic without breaking TLS, SSL, or any of the underlying ciphers. Now let’s talk about situations where your encrypted connection really can be broken. TLS and SSL support a wide range of cipher suites, many of them very strong and perfectly usable for today’s standards. If a server is not configured to use these strong cipher suites however, you could be thinking that your connection is pretty fortified because it’s using TLS but underneath it’s really using a cipher with very poor strength.
This is a very bad thing of course and I’m not sure how many servers out there are supporting or prioritising weak ciphers. SSL Pulse might be a good source to check if you’re curious. It’s also possible (but probably rare these days) that the server may be generating very weak keys due to a bug in Debian that was introduced in 2006. This bug was fixed in 2008 so you can see that it’s fairly old now. You’d also have to be connecting to a server that’s actually running Debian.
Read: The Shadow Factory: The NSA from 9/11 to the Eavesdropping on America
If you’re connecting to a server that’s properly configured, patched, using forward secrecy, and is using or at least prioritising strong ciphers then you should feel pretty confident. At the time of this writing and in an unrealistic world where support and usability is not an issue everything would be using TLS 1.2, HTTP Strict Transport Security, AEAD cipher suites with SHA-2, 4096-bit keys, and elliptic curve or other very strong cipher suites. Forward secrecy would be mandatory and deployed everywhere and there would be no systems still running with the weak key bug. Even though this is unrealistic things have greatly improved over the years so you can expect at least some of the above to apply for the majority of cases. If you look at servers from Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Amazon, or any other large well-known companies with a strong talent pool and ample resources you can be sure that they have their configuration setup well and will continue to do so. Just look at how Amazon has set themselves up.
Hopefully you now see the generalisation of statements made about the NSA and maybe even technology itself. These generalisations apply to many other statements about the NSA and technology in general. Sometimes things really do go wrong but usually it’s not as severe as it seems. For example, if TLS didn’t exist and all we had was SSL 3.0 then I would take back most things I’ve said in this article. The fact is that TLS has been around for a long time! The adoption, understanding, and technical work around it is what seems to always need to play catch-up. You’re also greatly relying on professionals in the field to do the right thing or to not be restricted by their employer to improve things even when nothing is going wrong (I’ve seen this happen often which is depressing). Things are always a lot more complex under the hood than they look but you can always be sure that there are many world class computer scientists, cryptographers, and mathematicians working on these incredibly complicated, large scale problems.